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Abstract: The traditional approach in legal comparative research is doctrinal rule-based. A 
relatively recent breakthrough has been the use of econometric techniques in comparing the 
extent of success in different jurisdictions with respect to, for example, protecting shareholders. 
The meshing of legal research and econometrics is known as ‘leximetrics’ (Lele & Siems, 
2007). One of the most prominent and widely cited use of leximetrics is the seminal study by 
La Porta and colleagues (1997, 1998 & 2000) on the correlation between shareholder protection 
and financial development. The study, though highly influential, has attracted various 
criticisms. Subsequent studies have sought to build on the study by coming up with improved 
research design. For example, using a panel dataset covering a range of developed and 
developing countries, researchers from the Cambridge Centre for Business Research have 
discovered that a significant upward movement in the level of shareholder protection was made 
by China between 1990 and 2013 (Armour et al., 2009; Siems, 2016). It has been suggested 
that between the period, China experienced the ‘biggest increase in shareholder protection’ 
amongst 30 countries studied, and China was amongst the top performers (along with France 
and Russia) in shareholder protection in 2013, performing even better than the UK and the US. 
At the same time, the World Bank’s (2017) Protecting Minority Investors Index, which forms 
part of its Doing Business Reports, has recently painted a rather opposite picture, in contrast to 
the positive assessment by the Centre for Business Research, by putting China in the 119th 
position out of 190 countries which indicates a very mediocre performance. This article seeks 
to address the question of whether and how the two studies, both employing leximetric 
techniques and examining an ostensibly similar issue, can point to discrepant results.  
 
 
* This article was originally prepared for the Inaugural Conference of the Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law on ‘Comparative Law: The Past, Present and Future’ on 9-10 June 2018, at 
Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, China. The authors would like to thank Prof. Lutz-Christian 
Wolff and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments. All errors are our own. 
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Introduction 
The role of institutions has become one of the most popular research areas as a result of the 
rise of New Institutional Economics in the 1980s.1 The study of institutions is important as it 
provides an explanation of international differences in economic development, which in turn 
can inform policy reform proposals both for international organisations like the World Bank 
and the OECD, as well as the governments of different countries. Different types of institutions 
have been examined by scholars in an abundant amount of studies with a view to providing a 
plausible explanation of cross-country differences in economic growth. 
 
As a ground-breaking contribution to Institutional Economics, La Porta and colleagues have 
examined legal rules covering the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin 
of these rules and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries.2 The study by La Porta and 
colleagues has phenomenally started a new branch of legal scholarship known as ‘Law and 
Finance’, which seeks to unearth the correlation between law and financial development.3  
 
Allen and colleagues once famously put the law, finance and growth nexus in the context of 
China.4 They argued that China represented an important counter-example to the wider law, 
institutions, finance, and growth literatures: neither the legal nor financial system was well 
developed, yet it had one of the fastest growing economies. However, this view inevitably has 
to be adjusted after more than a decade of development. Nowadays, it is worth noting that the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange is the fourth largest stock exchange in the world.5 Also, according 
to the Cambridge Centre for Business Research, China was one of the top performers in 
shareholder protection in 2013 amongst 30 jurisdictions studied, performing even better than 
the UK and the US.6 All these newer observations point to a confirmation of the law-finance-
growth nexus. China has strong laws, strong financial markets and strong economic growth. In 
                                                        
1 Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’ (2011) 7 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 473. 
2 See Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1131; La 
Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113; La Porta et al, ‘Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3. 
3 Mathias Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law’ (2007) 52 McGill Law 
Journal 55, 57. 
4 Franklin Allen et al, ‘Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China’ (2005) 77 Journal of Financial Economics 
57. 
5 The top 5 are: New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
London Stock Exchange, according to market capitalisation. Data from the World Federation of Exchanges, as 
of June 2017. 
6 Dionysia Katelouzou and Mathias Siems, ‘Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric 
Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990-2013’ (2015) 15 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 127, 134. 
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a sharp contrast, the World Bank’s Protecting Minority Investors Index, which forms part of its 
Doing Business Reports, presents a more pessimistic assessment by putting China in the 119th 
position out of 190 countries.7 China’s score of 4.8 was below the East Asia and Pacific average 
of 5.2, and below the average for OECD high income countries of 6.4. This article seeks to 
address this discrepant result, where China is both strong and mediocre in shareholder 
protection according to the two studies, which are largely built on the leximetric technique 
introduced by La Porta and colleagues. 
 
The first part of this paper will discuss the concerns arising from comparative law research, 
especially in a numerical context. The second part will discuss the trajectory of corporate and 
financial law reforms in China to establish a prima facie case of whether or not China is really 
a ‘top performer’ in protecting shareholders. Afterwards, the paper will compare and contrast 
in detail the methodological approaches and results of the two studies by the Cambridge Centre 
for Business Research and the World Bank respectively to unearth the root of discrepancies. 
Finally, the article will summarise some key observations made in this article and briefly reflect 
on their implications in the conclusion.  
 
A. Numerical Comparative Law 
Comparative law as a methodology has become particularly relevant as a result of 
globalisation, because the process of globalisation is fundamentally changing the significance 
of national and societal boundaries and generally making them less important.8 This situation 
requires an effective method to compare and contrast norms, institutions, cultures, attitudes, 
methodologies, even entire legal systems,9 and resolve problems arising from trans-border 
transactions and events.10 There is a spectrum of methods and the best approach will always be 
adapted in terms of the specific purposes of the research. 
 
The traditional approach in legal research is rule-based comparison. One approach is what 
Zweigert postulated as functionalism, which looks at the common function served by legal 
                                                        
7 The World Bank, ‘Doing Business – China’ (2017) 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/china/#protecting-minority-investors>. 
8 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (CUP, 2000) 81. 
9 Vernon Valentime Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ 
(2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 261, 262. 
10 Nicholas Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Resource’ (2006) 1 Journal of 
Comparative Law 1, 8. 
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systems.11 Other methods include legal history, numerical comparison, economics, and cross-
cultural psychology. Watson argued that, in the first instance, comparative law was concerned 
with legal history. 12  Often, comparison is seen as the social science’s equivalent of 
experiments, as a test for general theories of human behaviour.13 Thus, comparative economics 
and cross-cultural psychology can be applied to different nations. Meanwhile, numerical 
comparison is used by some scholars in an attempt to answer a complex question with a mere 
number.14  
 
Each method has its arguments for and against. For instance, rule-based comparison seems like 
the most obvious thing to do. But it fails to take account of systemic differences. For example, 
how can one compare English and French trusts? This is impossible since trusts do not exist in 
French law. One perceived solution is functionality which is regarded by many as the basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law.15 Instead of asking: ‘What legal requirements 
are there for sales contracts in foreign law?’ it is better to inquire, ‘How does foreign law protect 
parties from surprise, of from being held to an agreement not seriously intended?’16 However, 
the drawbacks of functionality are how to define ‘function’ and whether function is identical 
in legal systems.17 In addition, it does not consider cultural and historical differences.18 Van 
Hoecke and Warrington observed that the need for a broad approach to the subject of 
comparative law, thereby moving it beyond the ‘law as rules’ approach of traditional legal 
doctrine, had been acknowledged for some time. 19  It is becoming steadily apparent that 
comparatists cannot limit themselves to simply comparing rules. The ‘law as rules’ approach 
has to be placed in a much wider context. The ‘context of law’ is an essential part of 
                                                        
11 For a comprehensive picture of functionality, see Konrad Zweigert, ‘Methodological Problems in 
Comparative Law’ (1972) 7 Israel Law Review 465. 
12 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants an Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1993) 6; see 
also Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (OUP, 1998) 8-10. 
13 Niles Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, (OUP, 2006) 319-320. 
14 For example, La Porta el al distinguished several legal measures that are decisive for the protection of 
shareholder. Subsequently, they looked at those indicators in 49 countries, and accordingly marked each country 
‘0’ or ‘1’. See La Porta el al (n 2). 
15 For example, Zweigert and Kötz (n 12) 34; and John Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 
American Journal of Comparative Law 617, 620-623. 
16 Zweigert (n 11) 467. 
17 According to Zweigert and Kötz, ‘in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same 
function’. See Zweigert and Kötz (n 12) 34. 
18 For arguments against functionality, see Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in 
Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, 2006) 
381. 
19 Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a 
New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495. 
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comparative research.20  This context is not only the material context of sociology, history, 
economy, but also the ideological context of the law and ‘law as culture’. Therefore, 
comparison entails a societal comparison of the actual role and functioning of law in the 
compared societies, rather than comparing statutory rules or court decisions.  
 
According to Lele and Siems, there has been an increasing trend to quantify the law in relation 
to shareholder protection following on the influential study by La Porta and colleagues.21 The 
use of a ‘leximetric’ approach opens up into the study of comparative shareholder protection 
law.22  According to Cooter and Ginsburg, leximetrics may be able to allow comparative 
scholars to specify the relationship between law and finance with greater precision.23 The idea 
of a ‘legalisation’ index variable could facilitate comparative assessment of legal systems. 
Furthermore, it may also help establish how specificity in a single jurisdiction changes over 
time in response to various causal factors.24 
 
La Porta and colleagues have examined legal rules covering the protection of corporate 
shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules and the quality of their enforcement in 49 
countries.25 In this study, they used six variables to construct an index for ‘anti-director rights’. 
La Porta and colleagues have demonstrated a positive correlation between levels of investor 
protection and the development of capital markets. Two core ideas evolve from their law and 
finance theory. The first idea concerns ‘legal family’: shareholder laws in common law 
countries are superior to those in civil law countries. The second idea is that ‘law matters’: 
legal doctrine is crucial to financial market development (while enforcement has been 
overlooked). One may argue whether there is a causality or a reversed relationship between 
market development and legal rules. In contrast to La Porte and others’ approach, Coffee and 
Cheffins have shown, in the UK and the US the opposite sequence that financial markets 
develop first, and then create a political demand for investor protection.26 This shows that 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 532. 
21 Priya Lele and Mathias Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach’ (2007) 7 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 17. 
22 According to Lele and Siems, this term was first used in Robert Cooter and Tim Ginsburg, ‘Leximetrics: Why 
the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries than Others’ (2003), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520>.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 See La Porta et al (n 2). 
26 See John Coffee, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 1, 65-66; and Brian Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 459, 483-484. 
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despite empirical evidence may point to the observation that strong laws and markets co-exist, 
it is not clear if one is the cause of another.  
 
In Siems’s view, the comparative law methodology adopted by La Porta and colleagues is 
problematic because particular rules are not identical in different countries.27 Furthermore, it is 
doubtful whether the division between common and civil law is useful in talking about 
comparative corporate law. A strict division between legal families does not fit since 
international trade and legal transplants have always existed in this field.28 Such classification 
using legal families, with little regard to each particular country’s ‘demand for law’ in the first 
place, later attracted criticisms from other scholars.29 As suggested by Siems, it is overly-
simplistic to examine how different legal families shape finance.30 Roe rightly indicates that 
the distinction between common law and civil law systems is often exaggerated.31 Modern 
securities regulation revolves around a regulatory agency operating through a comprehensive 
regulatory code. This is not an intrinsic common law institutional advantage. The idea of the 
dominance of legal rules in financial markets is also in question. Coffee, Jackson and Roe, as 
well as Armour and colleagues have shown that enforcement is as important as substantive law 
for a strong capital market.32  
 
Furthermore, a country’s legal origin is not exogenous and thus has a political, social, 
economic, and cultural context. While La Porta and colleagues have pointed out the importance 
of legal foundation in terms of shareholder protection to capital market development, Roe has 
indicated that the political economy-based theories seem stronger than the legal origins 
theory. 33  He argues that continental social democracies did not provide institutions that 
securities markets need, such that the markets in continental Europe have flourished to a lesser 
degree than their Anglo-American counterparts. In social democracies, employees are 
                                                        
27 For a summary, see Mathias Siems, ‘What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La 
Porta et al’s Methodology’ (2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 300. 
28 Mathias Siems, ‘Numerical Comparative Law - Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce 
Complexity?’ (2005) 13 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 521, 528. 
29 See for example, Daniel Berkowit et al, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 
47 European Economic Review 165 and Siems (n 3). A mere categorisation of a system as common law or civil 
law disregards deeper legal structures. 
30 Siems (n 3) 15. 
31 Mark Roe, ‘Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets’ (2006) 120 Harvard Law Review 460, 481. 
32 John Coffee, ‘Law and Market: the Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 229; Howell Jackson and Mark Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-
Based Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207; and John Armour et al, ‘Private Enforcement of 
Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the US and UK’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687. 
33 Mark Roe, Political Determinant of Corporate Governance (OUP, 2003). 
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protected from actions that a company would often take to maximise the shareholder’s value. 
The goals between employees and shareholders often do not intersect. Employees prefer high 
wages and shareholders prefer lower wages. There is even an investment horizon problem. 
Employees are risk-averse because unlike a shareholder, who can have a diversified investment 
portfolio, their human capital is tied up in the company. Therefore, Roe’s argument is that 
‘where labour’s influence is strong, concentrated ownership should persist as a countervailing 
power and, hence, equity markets should develop less strongly’ and he supports his argument 
by showing the correlation between political orientation and ownership structure. 34 
Furthermore, political forces can also have direct influence. For example, in the continental 
system, those in power want to exercise more control through a bank-centred system because 
large banks are subject to more state control than securities markets. 35 This is clearly another 
political explanation of weak financial markets. Also, culture can be important. According to 
Licht and colleagues, particular cultural profiles in some regions are less compatible with good 
governance than with the profiles of West European and English-speaking countries.36 This 
perhaps can explain why the capital markets in some countries are weaker and also indicate the 
challenges faced by some emerging economies. Meanwhile, Siems has highlighted that the 
combination of legal and non-legal considerations can be problematic.37 It is difficult to know 
whether and how to aggregate these considerations.  
 
Another critique on La Porta’s methodology is their use of a limited set of criteria for their 
study on shareholder protection.38 It is doubtful whether six variables are good proxies for the 
general level of shareholder protection since they do not capture many important aspects of 
company law. While statistical analysis is widely utilised in the field of social science with a 
view to reducing complexity, giving legal rules ‘ones’ and ‘zeros’ may reduce the ‘richness of 
detail’ in legal research.39 In fact, as indicated by Spamann, many of the initial results from La 
                                                        
34 Roe (n 31) 503. 
35 Coffee (n 26) 75. Power seeking nationalists use banks as their agents and these banks resist the rise of rivals, 
the securities markets, for their business. 
36 Amir Licht et al, ‘Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance’ (2007) 
35 Journal of Comparative Economics 659. A study was conducted based on a comparison between a taxonomy 
of corporate governance regimes according to legal families and a classification of countries according to their 
shared cultural values. 
37 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (CUP, 2014) 173. 
38 Ibid. 170; Lele and Siems (n 21) 19-21. 
39 Kenneth Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus (Brookings, 2006) 171. 
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Porta and colleagues are not robust to the correction of coding errors.40 Legal rules differ across 
many relevant dimensions, in particular in international comparison. It is simply very difficult 
to draw the lines in each of them by variable definitions.  
 
Although the cross-country leximetric tests may have flaws, they have raised the awareness of 
the role of legal institutions for the performance of capital markets. The close link between 
investor protection and stock market development is widely accepted by policymakers and 
scholars. The next step will be to understand how the legal system actually helps. In a 
qualitative way, the focus will be put on how minority shareholders are protected from 
predatory controlling shareholders and opportunistic managers when studying the role of law 
and legal institutions in the context of corporation and equity finance in China. 
 
B. Trajectory of Development in Chinese Corporate and Financial Law 
In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China marked a new historic period of gaige kaifang, the twin strategies of economic 
reform and opening up. Prior to that, arguably there had not been a great demand for corporate 
and financial law, which is largely a branch of private law, in a predominantly state-dominated 
economy. One goal of company law should be to enable the organisation of economic activities 
in the private sector. In relation to SOE reform, the proposal to reform in China has had three 
broad phases: the state’s withdrawal from the operational decisions of SOEs, then from 
administrative oversight and ultimately from ownership. This was clearly reflected from the 
decline in the relative share of the exclusively state-owned companies in the economy and the 
emergence of hybrid structures co-owned by state entities and non-state actors.41 
                                                        
40 Holger Spamann, ‘The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited’ (2010) 23 Review of Financial Studies 467. 
41 Statistically, the dominance of SOEs in the Chinese economy has been diminishing from accounting for 76 
per cent of annual gross industrial output in 1980 to only around 15 percent in 2006. However, in some public 
utility industries including water, electricity, thermal energy and fuel, the market share of SOEs still exceeds 50 
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In response to the economic reforms, various laws were introduced as the supporting 
institutions.42 According to Lubman, it was important as the market economy relies on private 
law to serve as a framework to facilitate transactions defining the rights and duties created by 
business arrangements.43 For example, two laws related to foreign investment, the Law on 
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises and the Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Venture 
Enterprises, were promulgated in 1986 and 1988 respectively. For the SOE reform, the Law on 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, an early draft of the Company Law 1993, 
reaffirmed that the Communist Party’s explicit desire that the ownership and management of 
SOEs ‘be appropriately separated’.44 The regulatory response to the emergence of domestic 
enterprises came in 1992. The Standard Opinion for Limited Liability Companies and the 
Standard Opinion for Companies Limited by Shares were issued as interim measures before 
the promulgation of a comprehensive set of company laws. The first Company Law, based on 
previous draft regulations and the two Standard Opinions, was passed on 29 December 1993 
and became effective on 1 July 1994. 
 
The law served two main functions: first to establish a modern enterprise system compatible 
with the social market economy, and second to set out the legal basis for regulating different 
types of companies. The Company Law has since been amended four times, in 1999 and 2004 
to a limited extent, with more radical changes introduced in 2005 and 2013.45 The early 
                                                        
percent in order to protect public interests. See Sanlin Jin and Yuanyuan Wei, ‘Extent of Government Ownership 
or Control of the Means of Production and Enterprises’ in Xiaoxi Li (ed.), Assessing the Extent of China’s 
Marketisation (Ashgate, 2006) 239-242. 
42 Previous attempt to put the law-growth nexus into the context of China includes: Franklin Allen et al, ‘Law, 
Finance, and Economic Growth in China’ (2005) 77 Journal of Financial Economics 57; Dam (n 39) 232-78; 
Horace Yeung and Flora Huang, ‘Growth without Institutions? The Case of China’ (2013) 3 Durham Law 
Review 327; and Ding Chen and Simon Deakin, ‘On Heaven’s Lathe: State, Rule of Law, and Economic 
Development’ (2015) 8 Law and Development Review 123. 
43 Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford University Press, 1999) 174. 
44 The law was enacted by the National People’s Congress in 1988. 
45 The 2005 amendments enhanced shareholder rights in a number of aspects. See Flora Huang, ‘Modernising 
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Company Law was designed to pursue a distinctive mission in the socialist state of China, 
which was, to build an economic system that maintains socialist principles and goals.46 In a 
sharp contrast, the Company Law 2005 clearly stated that its aims are to ‘protect the legitimate 
and interests of companies, shareholders and creditors’ and, at the same time, ‘to promote the 
development of the socialist market economy’.47 Until the Company Law came into effect on 
1 July 1994, China had been unique in having shareholding companies and a securities market 
operating without either company law or securities law.48  Although the early legal framework 
was heavily criticised, it is believed that the current framework (laws-on-the-books) nowadays 
is comparable to developed countries, despite the doubt of whether other relevant supporting 
institutions are adequate.49 
 
The most notable improvement in shareholder protection was provided by the Company Law 
2005, and the current Company Law 2013 is generally following its predecessor. For a 
summary of key changes, see the Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
the Chinese Capital Market: Old Problems and New Legal Responses’ (2010) 21 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 26. The recent company law amendments in 2013 removed the requirement for 
companies to have a minimum level of capitalisation. It is expected to encourage more entrepreneurs to start 
their own businesses fostering the growth of the individual economic sector. See PwC China, ‘China’s Amended 
Company Law Facilitating More Business’ (2014). Available at <https://www.pwccn.com/en/china-tax-
news/chinatax-news-jan2014-1.pdf>. 
46 See Robert Art, and Minkang Gu, ‘China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic 
of China’ (1995) 20 Yale Journal of International Law 274. 
47 See art 1 of the Company Law 2005. 
48 Until the first set of securities laws came into effect in 1999, the Company Law had been supplemented by the 
Interim Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading, issued in May 1993 by the State Council Securities 
Committee, to help regulate the stock market. The Chinese Securities Law was adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on 29 December 1998, effective as of 1 July 1999, amended on 28 
August 2004 and revised 27 October 2005, effective as of 1 January 2006. The law was amended for the second 
time in 2013 and third time in 2014. The current version is the Securities Law 2014.  
49 For example, Lubman criticised that Chinese legal reform tended to use numerous general terms to express 
vague legal standards. See Lubman (n 43) 186. As briefly mentioned in the beginning, China is now amongst 
the top performers of shareholder protection, see Katelouzou and Siems (n 6). But laws-in-action can remain an 
issue. For example, Yeung expressed his concerns over the quality of Chinese judges and legal profession. See 
Horace Yeung, ‘Transferability of English Legal Concepts and Skills in China with respect to Corporate 
Regulation’ in Georges Depeyrot (ed.), When Orient and Occident Meet (Moneta, 2014) 347-348. 
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Table 1 – Selected Features of the Three Laws 
 
Description Company Law 
1993 
Company Law 
2005 
Company Law 
2013 
Fiduciary Duty of 
Directors, 
Supervisors and 
Senior Personnel 
Duty of loyalty only 
(art. 59) 
Duties of loyalty and 
care (art. 148) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 147) 
Fiduciary Duty of 
Controlling 
Shareholders 
N/A Controlling 
shareholders (50% or 
up) must show good 
faith in exercising 
their rights (art. 21) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 21) 
Exit Strategy N/A 1. Fail to distribute 
profits; 
2. Merger or split of 
company; 
3. Renewal of 
operation term or 
dissolution 
(art. 75) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 74) 
Information Rights Basic passive 
information rights 
(arts. 32 & 110) 
Enhanced 
information right 
plus right of making 
inquiries (arts. 34 & 
151) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (arts. 33 & 
150) 
Shareholders’ 
Meetings 
Basic powers (art. 
103) 
1. Power to initiate 
new motion (3% of 
shareholding); 
2. Right to individual 
notice (art. 103) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 102) 
Private Placement 
of Shares 
Not allowed (art. 73) Allowed (art. 78) Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 77) 
Pre-emptive Right N/A Yes (art. 35) Same as Company 
Law 2005 (art. 34) 
Shareholder Action No mention of civil 
remedies 
Derivative actions 
permitted and in 
some cases direct 
actions (arts. 152 & 
153) 
Same as Company 
Law 2005 (arts. 151 
& 152) 
 
Corporate law seeks to perform two general functions: first to establish the corporate form; and 
second to control conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies 50 On the other hand, the 
                                                        
50 John Armour et al, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strategies’ in John Armour et al (eds), The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP, 2017) 29-30. 
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securities law and together with other financial market rules, such as the corporate governance 
code and the listing rules, seek to fulfil two objectives: first to ensure that the prices of publicly 
traded securities are reasonably well-informed and second to ensure that public shareholders 
are protected by effective corporate governance arrangements once they become 
shareholders.51 For example, the Chinese securities law requires regular and ad hoc disclosures 
from listed companies. 52   Also, it is possible for the market regulator, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), to bring criminal or administrative actions against companies 
and their officers who have engaged in market misconduct.53 Further, in China, regulatory 
requirements regarding corporate governance are reflected in the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies issued in January 2002, which was developed in accordance 
with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The principal difference between the 
Chinese framework and that of elsewhere like the UK is that a ‘comply or explain’ principle 
has not been adopted. A listed company is required to take the contents specified in the Code 
into account when formulating or revising its articles of association and detailed management 
rules.54 Meanwhile, the CSRC has issued certain rules to implement the provisions in the Code. 
For instance, according to the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board 
of Directors of Listed Companies55, independent directors are to account for at least one-third 
of the membership of a company’s board of directors and should include at least one 
professional accountant. Compensation, audit and nomination committees are required to be 
chaired by an independent director and must be constituted by a majority of independent 
directors.56 All of the discussions above have to a large degree illustrated China’s commitment 
                                                        
51 Luca Enriques et al, ‘Corporate Law and Securities Markets’ in John Armour et al (eds), The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP, 2017) 243-258. See also Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy (Hart, 2015) 487. 
52 Securities Law 2014, arts 66 & 67. 
53 See Chapter XI of the Securities Law 2014. 
54 The Preamble of the Chinese Corporate Governance Code. 
55 Zhengjianfa [2001] No. 102, issued on 16 August 2001. 
56 The Chinese Corporate Governance Code, art 52. 
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to continuously improving its regulatory regime. 
 
C. What Numerical Comparative Law Tells Us about China 
Numerical comparative law has the dual use of measuring similarities and differences between 
systems, and measuring the quality of legal rules.57 From above, it is clear that China has made 
observable efforts in improving shareholder protection. However, it is still unclear how it has 
fared against other economies. The question can perhaps be answered by looking at some 
existing cross-country shareholder protection indices. The obvious one can be that compiled 
by La Porta and colleagues.58 Unfortunately, despite 49 countries were covered by their index, 
China was not one of them. Indeed, they did not include any socialist or ‘transition’ economies 
in the countries studied. Also, La Porta and colleagues examined the legal rules of the countries 
during 1993-1994. The result would be too outdated considering the first company law in China 
did not become effective until 1 July 1994. 
 
Despite La Porta and colleagues’ initial research was so controversial, later studies were largely 
built upon it and had improved research design. For example, Djankov and colleagues have 
looked at a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by 
corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index, as opposed to the index of anti-director rights 
adopted by La Porta and colleagues.59 The index was compiled for 72 countries and focused 
on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a 
specific self-dealing transaction. According to their findings, the index was sharply higher in 
common law countries than in French civil law countries. Also, the index was believed to be a 
statistically significant and economically strong predictor of a variety of measures of stock 
                                                        
57 Siems (n 37) 147. 
58 La Porta et al (n 2). 
59 Simeon Djankov et al, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-dealing’ (2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics 
430. 
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market development across countries. These results generally supported the findings of the 
earlier work by La Porta and colleagues. The Protecting Minority Investors Index in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business project is indeed based on the methodology adopted by Djankov and 
colleagues.60 
 
The importance of legal institutions in fostering a good business environment is underlined by 
the World Bank’s Doing Business project. 61  This project provides objective measures of 
business regulations and their enforcement across 190 economies and selected cities at the 
subnational and regional level. The first Doing Business report, published in 2003, covered 5 
indicator sets and 133 economies. The most recent report in 2017 covers 11 indicator sets and 
190 economies. Amongst which, the Protecting Minority Investors indicator is perhaps the 
most relevant in the context of this paper. The indicator measures the extent of protection from 
conflicts of interest and shareholders’ rights in corporate governance.62 The higher the index 
indicates a better protection of investors’ interests. The maximum score is 10. OECD high 
income countries on average get a score of 6.4 in 2017. On the other hand, China is ranked 
119th with a rather low score of 4.8. 
 
However, this does not necessarily indicate a grave concern about the legal institutions in 
China. If one looks at another dataset, there can be an entirely different conclusion. In light of 
the panel dataset covering a range of developed and developing countries from Armour and 
colleagues (for the Cambridge Centre of Business Research), they discovered that a significant 
upward movement in the level of shareholder protection was made by China between 1995 and 
                                                        
60 World Bank, ‘Doing Business: Metholodgy’ (2017). Available at: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology>. 
61 World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2018’ (2017). Available at: <http://www.doingbusiness.org>. 
62 Important parameters include the extent of disclosure, director liability, shareholder rights and suits, etc. 
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2005.63 China experienced a jump in its shareholder protection score from 5 to 6.5. According 
to this index, although the UK and the US were the top performers in 2005 (with scores of 
slightly more than 7), China was more protective of shareholders’ interests than some 
developed countries such as Germany and Switzerland. This dataset has since been updated to 
2013.64 It has been suggested that between 1990 and 2013 China experienced the ‘biggest 
increase in shareholder protection’ amongst 30 countries studied.65 China, Russia and France 
were the top performers in shareholder protection in 2013, performing even better than the UK 
and the US.66 To find out the cause of different results, it is necessary to take a closer look at 
the two studies.  
 
1. Overview of the Two Indices 
The World Bank’s Protecting Minority Investors Index measures the protection of minority 
investors from conflicts of interest through three major set of indicators.67 The goal is to  
measure the protection of shareholders against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal 
gain by distinguishing three dimensions of regulation that address conflicts of interest: i) 
transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index 68 ); ii) shareholders’ 
ability to sue and hold directors liable for self-dealing (extent of director liability index69); and 
iii) access to evidence and allocation of legal expenses in shareholder litigation (ease of 
shareholder suits index70 ). Each of the indicators ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 
                                                        
63 John Armour et al, ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal 
Origins Hypothesis’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 343. 
64 This is available via Mathias Siems, ‘CBR Extended Shareholder Protection Index’ (2016). Available at: 
<https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/256566/cbr-spi-30-countries-codebook-and-
methodology.pdf?sequence=9&isAllowed=y>.  
65 Katelouzou and Siems (n 6) 133. 
66 Ibid. 134. 
67 World Bank, ‘Protecting Minority Investors Methodology’ (2018). Available at: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/protecting-minority-investors>. 
68 The extent of disclosure index has five components. For further information on what these five compoenets 
are and how a score ranging from 1 to 3 is assigned to each of these compenents, see ibid.  
69 The extent of director liability index has seven components. For further information on what these seven 
compoenets are and how a score ranging from 1 to 2 is assigned to each of these compenents, see ibid. 
70 The ease of shareholder suits index has six components. For further information on what these six compoenets 
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indicating greater disclosure, greater liability of directors, and greater powers of shareholders 
to challenge the transaction respectively. The final score is the simple average of the scores for 
the three set of indicators. The data come from a questionnaire administered to corporate and 
securities lawyers. 
 
On the other hand, the dataset developed by the Centre for Business Research at the University 
of Cambridge consists of ten core variables71 which act as proxies for shareholder protection 
law.72 The variables were selected using several criteria.73 First, they are entitlements which, 
in theory, may be understood as responses to basic agency problems in business enterprise that 
might otherwise undermine the value of investors’ expected returns. For example, one of the 
variables, ‘feasibility of director’s dismissal’, reflects the ease with which shareholders can 
dismiss directors. Secondly, they are entitlements which are considered representative by the 
researchers of the project. These variables together cover the power of the general meeting and 
on who decides about its topics; on how voting takes place; on whether directors take the 
shareholders interests into account; on which legal actions shareholders can file; and on how 
shareholders are protected in the event of a change of corporate control. Thirdly, the variables 
selected were ones which were expected to have exhibited a relatively high degree of change 
over the period studied. The scores are expressed as a value between ‘0’ and ‘1’. ‘0’ would 
stand for no protection or worst protection offered and ‘1’ would stand for the best or maximum 
protection offered with respect to the particular core variable. In other words, the final score 
that a country will get will be the sum of the scores for all ten variables, meaning a maximum 
                                                        
are and how a score ranging from 1 to 2 is assigned to each of these compenents, see ibid. 
71 These ten core variables are: 1) powers of the general meeting for de facto changes; 2) agenda setting power; 
3) anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated; 4) prohibition of multiple voting rights (super voting rights); 
5) independent board members; 6) feasibility of director’s dismissal; 7) private enforcement of directors duties 
(derivative suit); 8) shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting; 9) mandatory bid; and 10) 
disclosure of major share ownership. 
72 Siems (n 64). 
73 Armour et al (n 63) 353-356. 
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final score of ten. The data were not based on questionnaires or surveys of lawyers, as is the 
case above with the World Bank’s index.74 The data on legal systems were collated with the 
assistance of chosen individuals, reviewed and finalised by the main researchers of the project. 
 
2. Comparing and Digging into the Methodology of the Two Indices 
The apparent divergence of what the two indices suggest can perhaps be explained by their 
differences in the choice of variables. Although both seek to reveal the cross-country 
differences in shareholder protection, they may have different objectives and scope, thereby 
research design, leading to China’s different performance in the two indices.  
 
One foremost issue is the timing of the research done. In Armour and colleagues’ study, the law 
in China was last coded in May 2013. Bearing in mind that the most recent company law in 
China came into effect on 1 March 2014, their research would only reflect the state of the 
previous company law, as well as other rules and regulations as of May 2013.75 In contrast, a 
new Doing Business Report is issued every year by the World Bank. As of today, the most 
recent one is ‘Doing Business 2018’, reflecting the law as of 1 June 2017. Therefore, to 
compare Armour and colleagues’ findings with those of the World Bank, it is more appropriate 
to refer to ‘Doing Business 2014’, reflecting the law as of 1 June 2013.76 Both indices would 
then describe the law of China as of roughly the same point of time. In the 2014 report, China 
was ranked 98th with a score of 5.0 (note a drop in both rank and score in the 2018 report, as 
aforementioned, when compared to this). By comparison, OECD high income countries on 
                                                        
74 Ibid. 351. 
75 But note, as least in a company law context, the differences between China’s Company Law 2005 and 
Company Law 2013 in light of shareholder protection are minimal, as shown in Table 1 above. But the same 
may not be said for other rules and regulations without some more careful examinations. 
76 The 2014 report data cover regulations measured from June 2012 through May 2013. World Bank, ‘Doing 
Business 2014’ (2013). Available at: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-
2014>. 
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average got a score of 6.2 at that time.  
 
Second, the scope of the two studies looks somewhat different. In Armour and colleagues’ 
study, they concerned shareholder protection in listed companies only.77 A typical regulatory 
system of capital market entails three tiers of regulation.78 Company law represents the bottom 
tier of regulation as it applies to all companies, both public and private companies. Securities 
law represents the second tier of regulation, in that it is only relevant to companies which issue 
securities to the public. Listing rules represent the top tier of regulation and are relevant only 
to a relatively small group of companies whose securities are admitted to listing. So, there is a 
need to consider all these three tiers of regulation for a listed company. By contrast, the Doing 
Business project overall, launched in 2002, has the aim of looking at ‘domestic small and 
medium-sized companies and measures the regulations applying to them through their life 
cycle’.79 Yet, the basic assumption in compiling the Protecting Minority Investors indicator is, 
the rules and regulations applicable to ‘a publicly traded corporation listed on the economy’s 
most important stock exchange’ are taken into account.80 For example, when they looked at 
New Zealand, a wide array of rules and regulations were taken into account, such as ‘the 
Companies Act, Financial Reporting Act, Securities Market Act, Exchange Listing Rules, 
Evidence Act, Limitation Act, Judicature Act, High Court Rules and Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors’.81 By contrast, in this regard, the scope of Armour and 
colleagues’ study was somewhat different, when the major point of reference is the company 
law and ‘in some cases’ securities law, as well as various codes, listing rules and caselaw. Also, 
another notable difference is by having constructed longitudinal indices using the time series 
                                                        
77 Siems (n 64) 3. 
78 Iain MacNeil and Alex Lau, ‘International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies’ 
(2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787. 
79 World Bank, ‘Doing Business: About Us’ (2017). Available at: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/about-us>. 
80 World Bank (n 67) 
81 World Bank (n 76) 97 
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data, Armour and colleagues’ study managed to go further to address the issue of the direction 
of causation between legal and economic change through relevant econometric and statistical 
techniques.82 By contrast, the Doing Business project just seeks to measure and compare 
business regulations between economies, though time series data are still generated to show 
year-to-year legal changes. 
 
Third, the scale, resources and staffing of the two projects are different. The Doing Business 
project was founded by Simeon Djankov, Michael Klein and Caralee McLiesh, under the World 
Bank. In the 2014 report, data collection and analysis were conducted through under the 
leadership of Augusto Lopez-Claros with the support of several dozen World Bank employees. 
In particular for the Protection of Minority Investors index, the data come from a questionnaire 
administered to corporate and securities lawyers and are based on securities regulations, 
company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence.83 In 2017 (the information 
for 2014 is no longer available), the opinions of 12 Chinese lawyers were consulted for the 
exercise. On the other hand, Armour and colleagues’ study was part of a project entitled ‘Law, 
Finance & Development’, led by Simon Deakin, John Armour and Ajit Singh and hosted by 
the Centre for Business Research at Cambridge, with the support of 10 other researchers, and 
funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK and other bodies. In 
particular for the coding of Chinese law, it was predominantly done by Mathias Siems with the 
input of Rui Wang.84 Although there is no ground to question the expertise of Siems and Wang, 
the World Bank has managed to draw on the opinions of more local lawyers to confirm the 
laws in each particular economy.  
                                                        
82 Simon Deakin et al, ‘Law, Finance and Development: Full Research Report’ (2009) ESRC End of Award 
Report, RES-156-25-0037. Available at: <http://www.researchcatalogue.esrc.ac.uk/grants/RES-156-25-
0037/read>. 
83 World Bank (n 67). 
84 Siems (n 64) 28. 
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Fourth, differences are seen in the choice of variables. As mentioned before, the use of six 
variables in La Porta and colleagues’ initial research was regarded by commentators as 
‘limited’.85  The World Bank Index assesses the strength of minority shareholder protections 
against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. The research design assumes a  
related-party transaction  between  two  companies  where  one  individual  is  the  controlling  
shareholder and a member of the boards of directors of both. The transaction is overpriced and 
causes damages to the buying company. The Index measures three aspects of investor 
protections: approval and transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure), 
liability of company directors for self-dealing (extent of director liability) and shareholders’ 
ability to obtain corporate documents before and during derivative or direct shareholder 
litigation (ease of shareholder suits). There are 18 variables spreading quite evenly under these 
three broad areas of concern. By contrast, there are 10 variables in Armour and colleagues’ 
study reflecting five areas of concern, namely, shareholder decision rights, control on directors, 
shareholder suits, takeover and disclosure of majority stakes. There are notable differences and 
overlap between these variables. One major difference is the fact that takeover is not an area 
covered and considered by the World Bank’s index. In relation to overlap, one example is the 
fact that the extent of disclosure variables in the World Bank’s index are somewhat connected 
to the variables on shareholder decision rights in Armour and colleagues’ study. The former 
asks which entities can provide legally sufficient approval for related-party transactions. 
Meanwhile, the latter concerns more on the shareholders control in substantial property 
transactions (when the transactions involve half or more of the company’s assets). Likewise, 
the extent of director liability variables (note the ease of shareholder suits variables indeed 
concern the civil procedure rules which are not examined by Armour and colleagues’ study) in 
                                                        
85 The six variables are one share-one vote; proxy by mail; requirement to deposit shares prior to general 
shareholders meeting; cumulative voting; oppression remedy; and pre-emptive rights. 
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the World Bank’s index may be viewed together with the shareholder suits variables in Armour 
and colleagues’ study. Both consider the availability of derivative suits. 
 
Finally, in light of the critiques on La Porta and colleagues’ initial research, subsequent studies 
have devoted considerable efforts in addressing the former’s shortcomings. As said, one 
innovation, common to all subsequent studies, is the expansion of the number of variables. 
Another innovation is, Armour and colleagues have used graduated variables, in order to 
capture more of the detail of legal variation when La Porta and colleagues had largely relied 
on binary variables. 86  Furthermore, Armour and colleagues have tried to recognise the 
methodological constraint imposed on the coding of law, which involves an unavoidable degree 
of judgement. Therefore, they have made notable efforts in documenting the precise source of 
legal authority upon which the coding was based, and the grounds of any interpretive 
judgement exercised.87 Similar efforts have been made in the World Bank project. Rather than 
using 1 and 0 to denote whether a rule is present or not, intermediate result is permitted.88 Also, 
the justification of why a specific score is given to each variable is explained in the report, 
though the exact legal authority is not pinpointed like Armour and colleagues’ study. 
  
3. Decoding the Results 
It has been shown that China performed well in Armour and colleagues’ study but less so in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business project. It is necessary to examine the scores in the selected 
variables to reveal the reason for discrepancy. In the 2014 Doing Business Report, New Zealand 
                                                        
86 Deakin et al (n 82). 
87 Ibid. See also Siems (n 64).  
88 For example, in the World Bank Index, on which corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for 
the related party transaction. A score of 0 is assigned if it is the CEO or the managing director alone; 1 if the 
board of directors, the supervisory board or shareholders must vote and the interested director/shareholder is 
permitted to vote; 2 if the board of directors or the supervisory board must vote and the interested 
director/shareholder is not permitted to vote; 3 if shareholders must vote and the interested director/shareholder 
is not permitted to vote. 
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provided the strongest minority investor protections according to the index. The jurisdiction 
had achieved this excellent result for the ninth year in a row before that. As a side note, it is 
worth highlighting that the current champion in 2017 was Kazakhstan, a jurisdiction probably 
least expected by many, when New Zealand slipped into the second.89 However, this article 
does not wish to use either as the source of ‘control variables’ to compare the two studies when 
New Zealand and Kazakhstan were not included in Armour and colleagues’ study. Instead, this 
article will compare the scores of the US and UK, which both have the largest financial markets 
in the world and traditionally perceived as having strong company and financial laws90, and 
China in the 2014 Doing Business Report in order to reveal the possible cause of discrepancies 
(see Table 2 below). A similar comparison will also be performed later by using the data in 
Armour and colleagues’ study. 
Table 2 – Selected Results of Protecting Minority Investors Indicator by the World Bank 
Indicator China’s 
Score 
UK’s Score US’s Score 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 10 10 7 
Which corporate body provides legally 
sufficient approval for the transaction 
3 3 1 
Whether disclosure by the interested majority 
shareholder-director to the board of directors is 
required 
2 2 2 
                                                        
89 World Bank (n 61). Kazakhstan has been exceptionally committed to improving its corporate and financial 
regime. See Horace Yeung et al, ‘Institutional Development and the Astana International Financial Centre’ 
(2019) forthcoming in Central Asian Yearbook of International and Comparative Law.  
90 For example, Hansmann and Kraakman once predicted that all jurisdictions would prompt along the US and 
the UK line in terms of shareholder protection owing to their perceived superiority. Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439. A 2012 
reflection of their arguments can be found in Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Reflections on the End 
of History for Corporate Law’ in Abdul Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa (eds), The Convergence of Corporate 
Governance (Palgrave, 2012). 
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Whether immediate disclosure of the 
transaction to the public, or the shareholders is 
required. 
2 2 2 
Whether disclosure in the annual report is 
required 
2 2 2 
Whether it is required that an external body, for 
example, an external auditor, review the 
transaction before it takes place 
1 1 0 
Extent of director liability index (0-10) 1 7 9 
Whether shareholder plaintiffs are able to sue 
directly or derivatively for the damage the 
transaction causes to the company 
1 1 1 
Whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold 
the interested majority shareholder-director 
liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller 
transaction causes to the company. 
0 2 2 
Whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold 
the approving body liable for the damage the 
transaction causes to the company 
0 1 2 
Whether a court can void the transaction upon 
a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff 
0 1 2 
Whether the interested majority shareholder-
director pays damages for the harm caused to 
the company upon a successful claim by the 
shareholder plaintiff 
0 1 1 
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Whether the interested majority shareholder-
director repays profits made from the 
transaction upon a successful claim by the 
shareholder plaintiff 
0 1 1 
Whether fines and imprisonment can be applied 
against the interested majority shareholder-
director 
0 0 0 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 4 7 9 
Whether shareholders owning 10% of the 
company’s share capital have the right to 
inspect the transaction documents before filing 
suit 
1 0 1 
Whether shareholders owning 10% of the 
company’s share capital can request that an 
inspector investigate the transaction 
0 1 0 
Whether the plaintiff can obtain any documents 
from the defendant and witnesses during trial. 
0 2 4 
Whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of 
relevant documents from the defendant without 
identifying each document specifically 
0 1 1 
Whether the plaintiff can directly examine the 
defendant and witnesses during trial 
2 2 2 
Whether the standard of proof for civil suits is 
lower than that for a criminal case 
1 1 1 
Strength of investor protection index (0-10) 5.0 8.0 8.3 
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Source: World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2014’ (2013). 
It can be seen that China and the UK were highly regarded in the extent of disclosure required 
from companies (less so for the US). Both scored a perfect 10 in this area. Comparatively, 
China fared less well against the US and UK in the ease of shareholder suits, and even far 
worse, in the extent of director liability. Information is important for both investor and 
shareholder protection. IPO prospectuses allow prospective shareholders to make informed 
investment decisions. Meanwhile, existing shareholders' participation in the decision-making 
process requires their access to information, mainly disseminated via regular financial reports 
and ad hoc announcements. Furthermore, the early Chinese Company Law gave shareholders 
the right to review and examine some of the company documents.91 At the basic level, this 
generally meant that shareholders could, usually upon payment of a fee, obtain documents and 
information including a copy of the company articles, personal information of company 
officers, financial reports, minutes of shareholders’ meetings and so on. On top of these, the 
2005 law granted shareholders the power to examine the company's accounts.92 This access is 
particularly crucial because some accounting anomalies might be reflected in the accounting 
records rather than the financial statements. However, China lost five points in the ease of 
shareholder suit when the shareholder plaintiff has limited rights in obtaining any documents 
from the defendant in a shareholder suit, when for example compared to the US. Such rights 
are not normally determined by the company and financial law, but rather the civil procedural 
rules of a jurisdiction. In this context of China, the competent legislation is the Civil Procedure 
Law.93 
 
Turning to the extent of director liability, where China performed rather poorly, one notable 
                                                        
91 Company Law 1993, arts 32 & 110.  
92 Company Law 2005, art 33. 
93 The law was adopted at the 4th Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on April 9, 1991; amended 
for the first time on October 28, 2007; and amended for the second time on August 31, 2012. 
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shortfall in China’s regime was the absence of an unfair prejudice remedy which effectively 
gave the US and the UK substantial points in the index. Under Section 994 of the UK 
Companies Act, a shareholder, who believes he or she has been unfairly discriminated against 
or unfairly prejudiced by the manner in which the affairs of his or her company have been 
conducted, may seek assistance from the court. In the view of Kershaw, non-arm’s length 
related-party transactions constitutes ‘a visible departure from fair dealing’ and can therefore 
be regarded as “unfair prejudice”’.94 There is a wide range of remedies at the court’s disposal 
if the action succeeds, including but not limited to, requiring the company or any other person 
to acquire the shareholder’s shares to give the latter an exit right; or requiring the company or 
any other person to pay compensation to a person; or setting aside action taken by the company 
or the board in breach of the law; etc.95 On the face of it, in China, if a shareholder of the 
company abuses its shareholder’s rights, thereby causing losses to the company or other 
shareholders, the wrongdoing shareholder shall be liable for compensation according to the 
law.96 Hawes and colleagues regard this as the Chinese ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy.97 However, 
at the same time, they indicate that the wording of the Chinese remedy is vague, and the 
Supreme People’s Court of China has not clarified its meaning. Huang also agrees that this 
remedy ‘is too vague to be capable of being enforced in reality’.98 To sum up, a less plaintiff 
friendly Civil Procedure Law and the absence of an unfair prejudice remedy in Chinese 
company law has certainly cost China dearly in the World Bank ranking. 
 
With respect to Armour and colleagues’ study, China, Russia and France were the top 
                                                        
94 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2012) 694. 
95 UK’s Companies Act 2006 s 996.  
96 Company Law 2013, art 20.  
97 Colin Hawes et al, ‘The Chinese “Oppression” Remedy: Creative Interpretations of Company Law by 
Chinese Courts’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 559. 
98 Hui Huang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis’ 
(2012) 27 Banking & Finance Law Review 619, 625. 
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performers in shareholder protection in 2013, outperforming the US and the UK. It may be 
useful to see in what way China has done better than the latter two. For a breakdown of scores 
for these three jurisdictions in Armour and colleagues’ index, see Table 3. 
Table 3 – Performance of the US, UK and China in Armour and Colleagues’ Shareholder 
Protection Index in 2013 
Variable* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Aggre. 
Score 
China 1 0.75 0.5 1 0.6 0.5 0.75 1 1 0.75 7.85 
UK 0.75 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.9 0.75 1 1 1 7.40 
US 0.75 1 1 0.5 1 0.75 0.5 1 0 0.75 7.25 
*Note: Variables 1 to 10 are: 1) Powers of the general meeting for de facto changes; 2) Agenda setting power; 3) 
Anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated; 4) Prohibition of multiple voting rights (super voting rights); 5) 
Independent board members; 6) Feasibility of director’s dismissal; 7) Private enforcement of directors duties 
(derivative suit); 8) Shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting; 9) Mandatory bid; and 10) 
Disclosure of major share ownership. 
It can be seen that the aggregate scores of the three jurisdictions were not substantially different. 
Katelouzou and Siems attributed China’s success to the adoption of the Chinese Company Law 
2005 which had introduced some Western standards of shareholder protection.99 From Table 3, 
it can be seen that China has done notably better than the US and the UK in relation to Variables 
1 & 4. Variable 1 is about the shareholder approval in large asset sales.100 Under the Chinese 
Company Law, if the amount of the major assets purchased or sold or the amount of security 
provided by a listed company within one year exceeds 30 percent of the total assets of the 
company, a resolution shall be passed by the general meeting and adopted by two thirds or 
more of the voting rights held by the shareholders present at the meeting.101 By contrast, in the 
UK, ad hoc disclosures will be required in the case of significant transactions for ‘premium’ 
                                                        
99 Katelouzou and Siems (n 6). 
100 If the sale of more than 50 percent of the company’s assets requires approval of the general meeting, a score 
1 is assigned; if the sale of more than 80 percent of the assets requires approval, 0.5 is given; otherwise, 0 is 
given. If no clearly predominant opinion exists, intermediary score is possible. 
101 Company Law 2005, art 122; Company Law 2013; art 121. 
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issuers only.102 A transaction is classified by assessing its size relative to that of the listed 
company proposing to make it.103 The comparison of size is made by using the percentage 
ratios resulting from applying the class test calculations to a transaction. A Class 2 transaction 
will be one where any percentage ratio is 5 percent or more but each is less than 25 percent; 
and Class 1 transaction for a percentage ratio 25 percent or more. Class 2 transaction requires 
the notification of certain information on the transaction to the market via a ‘Regulatory 
Information Service’, one example of which is Regulatory News Service, owned by the London 
Stock Exchange. For Class 1 transaction, in addition to using Regulatory Information Service, 
it requires publication of a ‘Class 1 Circular’, approved by the UK Listing Authority, to its 
shareholders and obtain their approval in a general meeting for the transaction.104 In the US, 
approval is required in case of ‘substantially all of its property and assets’, but there is not a 
specific qualifying percentage.105 
 
China has also done notably better in relation to Variable 4. Variable 4 is essentially about 
whether the one-share-one-vote principle will apply. 106  Scholars have divided opinions 
regarding the one-share-one-vote principle.107 On the one hand, it is regarded as a bedrock 
principle of corporate governance. On the other hand, it may destroy shareholder democracy. 
In China, the company law firmly recognises the principle.108 In the UK, the principle is a 
default position under the Companies Act 2006, but subject to any provision of the company’s 
articles.109 Although the UK has one of the most liberal regimes in this regard (therefore scored 
0 point in this variable), Huang observes that multiple voting rights have been rare among UK 
listed companies owing to the market pressure and successful opposition from institutional 
investors.110 In the US, like the UK, the principle is a default position under Delaware’s 
company law but companies can opt out from it.111 The NYSE and NASDAQ permit pre-
existing shares with multiple voting rights, but once listed, companies are prohibited to 
                                                        
102 For the distinction between premium and standard listings, see Horace Yeung, ‘The Admission and 
Regulation of Overseas Issuers: A Survey of Top Four Financial Centres' in Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of IPOs (OUP, forthcoming in 2018). 
103 UK Listing Rule (LR) 10.2.1G. 
104 LR 10.5.1R. 
105 Delaware General Corporation Law § 271(a). 
106 If there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights, 1 is given; otherwise, 0 is given. Intermediary score is 
possible. 
107 For a literature review, see Flora Huang, ‘Dual Class Shares around the Top Financial Centres’ [2017] 
Journal of Business Law 137, 138-141. 
108 Company Law 2005, art 104; Company Law 2013; art 103. 
109 UK Companies Act 2006 s 284. 
110 Huang (n 107) 145 
111 Delaware General Corporation Law § 212(a) 
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implement changes that would discriminate against the interests of existing shareholders.112 
 
At the same time, there are areas that China has done notably less well. Variable 5 concerns the 
independent director requirement.113 As said before, in China, independent directors are to 
account for at least one-third of the membership of a company’s board of directors.114 In the 
UK, the UK Corporate Governance Code requires that except for smaller companies, at least 
half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise independent directors.115 The US 
position has been the same.116 Variable 6 concerns the possibility to remove a director.117 Under 
Chinese company law, shareholders may remove a director.118 It is unclear why China scored 
lower than the US and the UK when the justifications apparently relate to whether the reason 
of removal and compensation would be required. But the former ‘seems not to be required 
under the Company Law 2005’ and the latter is understood to be a possibility only.119 This 
certainly points to the problem of using graduated variables and the degree of subjective 
judgement required in assigning a score to the variables. It is not always clear why a particular 
score is given.  
 
4. Reconciling the Results  
On the cover page of Mathias Siems’ Comparative Law120, which provides a very accessible 
and well written account of the research methodology, one can find photos of apples and 
oranges on the book’s cover. In the view of Suk, this reflects the challenge of comparative 
analysis that it is difficult to ‘capture fully the unique, distinctive and incomparable features of 
any given legal problem, culture, institution or case’.121 In the context of this paper, comparing 
the two indices compiled by Armour and colleagues and the World Bank may really be akin to 
comparing apples and oranges. As discussed before, although the prima facie ambits of the 
                                                        
112 NYSE Listed Company Manual r313(A); and NASDAQ r5640. 
113 If  at  least  half  of  the  board  members must  be  independent, a score of 1 is assigned; if 25 percent of 
them must be independent, 0.5 is given; otherwise, 0 is given. Intermediary score is possible. 
114 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, art I(3). 
115 The UK Corporate Governance Code B1.2. Here a smaller company is one that is below the FTSE 350. 
116 NYSE Listed Company Manual r303A.01. 
117 A score of 0 is assigned if good reason is required for the dismissal of directors; 0.25 given if directors can  
always be dismissed but are always compensated for dismissal without good reason; 0.5 given if directors are 
not always compensated for dismissal without good reason but they could have concluded a non-fixed term 
contract with the company; 0.75 given if  in cases of dismissal without good reason directors are only 
compensated if compensation is specifically contractually agreed; 1 given if there are no special requirements 
for dismissal and no compensation has to be paid. Intermediary score is possible. 
118 Company Law 2005, art 38; Company Law 2013; art 37; cf. UK Companies Act 2006 s 168 for example. 
119 Siems (n 64) 29. 
120 Siems (n 37). 
121 Julie Suk, ‘Beyond Apples and Oranges’ (2016) 64 American Journal of Comparative Law 512. 
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indices look the same as written on the tin, one is called ‘Shareholder Protection Index’ and 
another one is called the ‘Protecting Minority Investors indicator’, the actual focuses are 
somewhat different. The former’s concern lies in listed companies whereas that of the latter 
lies more on small and medium-sized enterprises. These two types of companies face different 
challenges in corporate governance. In listed companies, there is a higher likelihood of 
separation of ownership and control. The classic agency problem in this organisational 
structure lies in assuring that the managers are responsive to the shareholders’ interest rather 
than pursuing their own personal interests.122 In small and medium-sized enterprises, where a 
concentrated ownership structure is more likely, the concern lies more with the conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders. The majority generally have a tendency to 
expropriate the minority. 
 
As a result, it makes sense for the World Bank index to place more focus on the unfair prejudice, 
or also called oppression, remedy, which is useful in a private company (i.e. non-listed) setting. 
Despite a range of possible outcomes arising from a successful action, the most common one 
is an order that the petitioners’ shares be purchased by the controllers or the company.123 A 
share purchase order gives the petitioner an opportunity to exit from the company with the fair 
value of his or her investment. In a sharp contrast, this might not be useful in a public company 
where shareholders can choose to sell their shares via the market. That is why the presence of 
this unfair prejudice remedy has been rightly excluded from their variables in Armour and 
colleagues’ study. Furthermore, it is questionable as to whether in practice the remedy is a 
powerful shareholder protection weapon. Private enforcement of shareholder rights has never 
been the main landscape of the English model of corporate governance (but the story of the US 
has been entirely different, which is far more litigious).124 One explanation to this is that both 
civil procedure rules and substantive corporate law seem more ‘plaintiff-friendly’ in the US 
than another side of the Atlantic.125 As discussed before, there is a debate of whether the unfair 
prejudice remedy actually exists in China.126  
 
Whilst the difference in the scope of comparison may offer an explanation for China’s varying 
                                                        
122 Armour et al (n 50) 29-30. 
123 Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 
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124 John Armour et al (n 32). 
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performance in the two indices, in terms of the overlap areas, the two indices in principle do 
point to consistent observations. As mentioned, powers of the general meeting to control 
substantial property transactions in China have been viewed positively by Armour and 
colleagues. On the other hand, both China and the UK have scored full points in the extent of 
disclosure index of the World Bank which relates to the transparency and approval of related-
party transactions. Similarly, although China has scored only one point (out of ten) in the extent 
of director liability of the World Bank index, this one point has already reflected the availability 
of derivative suits in China, which can largely be confirmed by Variable 7 of Armour and 
colleagues’ study.127 
 
Conclusion 
The strength of a jurisdiction in protecting shareholders can be interpreted differently 
depending on the choice of variables in a leximetric study. In comparing the two indices 
concerning the state of shareholder protection in China, it can be seen that the breadth of 
variables with regard to corporate and financial law generally is notable in Armour and 
colleagues’ study, while the depth of variables is notable in the World Bank study highlighting 
the specific issues in controlling a related-party transaction. Although the performance of China 
in the two indices is varied, this outcome does not necessarily cast doubt on the robustness of 
either studies. The discrepancy largely comes from the angles chosen. Armour and colleagues’ 
study concerns more about the principal-agent conflict in a listed company, whilst the World 
Bank study concerns more about the majority-minority conflict in a small and medium-sized 
enterprise. Apparently, China has done well in the former through various reforms to its 
corporate and financial law. Meanwhile, for the latter, the World Bank is right to say, the 
absence of an explicit oppression remedy and more plaintiff friendly civil procedure rules may 
be a concern. Needless to say, each study has its own problem. In Armour and colleagues’ study, 
it is not always clear how values are assigned to the graduated variables despite an attempt to 
be transparent in their coding process. In the World Bank study, if the focus is on small and 
medium-sized enterprise, it is unclear why securities law and listing rules have to be consulted 
when it is not normal for them to go to the stock market for money. All in all, the bottom line 
                                                        
127 Under Variable 7, if derivative action is not available or its hurdle is too high (requires at least 20 percent of 
share capital to bring it), a score 0 is assigned; if there are some restrictions  (e.g. certain percentage of share 
capital), 0.5 is given; if it is readily available, 1 is given. Intermediary score is possible, although it is rather 
unclear why both China and the UK were assigned the same score of 0.75 when the litigants in China must 
possess more than 1 percent of shares in the company. See art 151 of the Chinese Company Law 2013. Such a 
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is both studies are certainly capable of showing some insights in the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Chinese system, as well as providing a basis for cross-country comparison, but with an 
important understanding that both studies managed to consider the laws-on-the-books only. 
Effective law enforcement is a primary concern for any legal systems. While the laws-on-the-
books are easier for researchers to turn them into numerical indices, these rules may have little 
to do with the reality of actual practice, particularly in developing countries like China.128 Even 
if a country is getting the highest score in a study, it does not necessarily mean that shareholders 
are actually better protected in that particular country than others. 
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